Many analysts and people who live in the region say that the mass protests that have rocked Iran in the past few months are the biggest threat to the Islamic Republic's existence since it was founded in 1979. The size, duration, and cross-sectional nature of the protests have led people to compare them not only to past waves of protests but also to the revolutionary moment itself.
But the way Iran's Arab neighbors have reacted is very different from how they have reacted in the past when there have been problems in Iran. This time, the Arab world's reaction has been very calm, almost too calm, compared to the protests that happened in 2022 after the death of Mahsa Amini while she was in the custody of the morality police.
The main pan-Arab TV networks, which used to spend hours covering every event on the streets of Iran, are now only giving it brief coverage. The Gulf states' governments, which have historically been quick to point out Tehran's internal weaknesses, are not making any public statements at all. During the 2022 protests, social media sites in Arab countries were full of comments, but now they are much quieter.
This silence is not a mistake or a sign of indifference. Instead, it shows a big change in the region's power dynamics, a rethinking of strategic priorities, and most importantly, a growing fear of what might happen if the Iranian state falls apart.
From being afraid of Iranian power to changing strategy
When Amini died in 2022, there were protests all over Iran. Many Arab societies watched the events with barely concealed excitement. At that time, Tehran seemed to be the clear leader in Middle Eastern affairs. Over the years, it had built a complex network of allies and proxy armed groups that stretched from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aden.
Iran's "Axis of Resistance," which included Hezbollah in Lebanon, various Shia militias in Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, was a powerful tool for influencing the region. This network let Tehran show its strength far beyond its borders, threaten enemies through proxies that could not be traced back to Iran, and keep its strategic depth in case the US or Israel attacked.
For Arab nations, especially the Gulf monarchies, this Iranian framework of influence constituted an existential threat. People in 2022 were very hopeful that a change of government in Tehran could bring down this whole structure, undoing decades of Iranian progress and changing the balance of power in the region.
But today, the strategic picture has changed a lot. The conflicts that followed Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, have mostly destroyed Tehran's carefully built regional structure. This happened not because of changes within Iran, but because of military force from outside Iran.
Hezbollah, once thought to be the best Iranian proxy force and one of the best non-state military groups in the world, has gotten a lot worse. Israeli operations have killed many of its top leaders, destroyed a lot of its weapons, and severely limited its ability to carry out operations. The group that used to threaten Israel's northern communities with missiles now has trouble keeping its own organization together.
The Assad regime in Syria, which Iran and Russia spent years and billions of dollars keeping in power through brutal military action, has fallen apart very quickly. The fall of Damascus not only cut off a key connection in Iran's regional network, but it also cut off the land bridge that let Tehran send supplies to Hezbollah and keep its strategic depth in the Levant.
Iran has been humiliated directly in the military. Israeli attacks in June easily got through Iran's air defenses, and American military action showed that Iran is weak against better conventional forces. The "ring of fire" that Iran built around Israel, which was talked about a lot, is mostly gone now.
In this new situation, many Arab officials privately admit that Iran has gone from being an existential threat to a second-tier concern. The sense of urgency that used to be present in Gulf states' evaluations of Iranian power has faded. Instead, there is now a more measured, some would say complacent, evaluation of Tehran's weaker abilities.
The Weakness Paradox: Why the Decline of Iran Makes Arabs Nervous
Even though Iran is clearly getting weaker, Arabs are not excited about making it even more unstable. The lessening of Iranian power lessens one set of worries, but it also makes another set of worries worse: the possibility of an uncontrolled state collapse.
For the past two decades, the governments of the Gulf have been dealing with the problems caused by failed and failing states in the rest of the Middle East. The 2003 American invasion of Iraq set off sectarian violence and the breakdown of the state, which are still going on. The civil war in Syria caused a huge humanitarian disaster that will go down in history. Lebanon's slow-motion collapse has shown that even a slow failure of the state can make the whole subregion unstable. The war in Yemen has shown how quickly failed states can become breeding grounds for extremism and sources of instability.
These events have left lasting memories in the institutions of Gulf capitals. State failure has led to wars that have caused waves of refugees, which have put a strain on social services and the job market. It has also led to extremist fighters looking for new places to fight and networks of arms and drug smuggling that are growing and weakening state authority across the region. The Saudi and Emirati interventions in Yemen, which were first planned as short-term operations, turned into years of costly involvement with no clear end in sight.
An unstable Iran would present a distinctly more perilous threat than any previously encountered in the region. Iran has more than 90 million people, which is more than Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon combined. Because it is close to all of the Gulf states, a collapse of the Iranian state could cause record numbers of refugees to leave. The costs of managing such displacement in terms of infrastructure and society would be huge.
The fate of Iran's military capabilities in the event of state dissolution is even more troubling. The Islamic Republic has one of the biggest stockpiles of missiles in the Middle East, advanced drone warfare skills that have been used in Yemen and Ukraine, and an unknown amount of enriched uranium, which is the technical basis for building nuclear weapons. If the state falls apart, these assets could end up in the hands of Revolutionary Guard factions, criminal networks, or extremist groups, all of which might be willing to use or sell them.
Gulf planners' worst nightmare is not a strong Iran, but one that is falling apart: different armed groups fighting for control of land and weapons, with no clear authority to negotiate or keep things in check.
The American Variable and the Danger of Regional War
Arab states are being more careful because they don't know what the US will do next. The Trump administration's approach to Iran combines tough talk with unpredictable action, making it hard for Gulf allies to figure out what to do.
American threats of military action if the Iranian government keeps violently putting down protests, violence that has already happened on a large scale, add another factor to the calculations in the region. Gulf states may privately welcome American pressure on Tehran, but they know that any military conflict would likely involve their territories, either as bases for American operations or as targets for Iranian retaliation.
The Iranian attacks on American targets in June were mostly symbolic and carefully planned to avoid escalation, but they served as a reminder that Tehran can still strike anywhere in the Gulf. Iranian officials have made it clear that any American military action would lead to responses against countries that host American troops. This includes almost all of the Gulf states.
The leaders of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait do not want to be in the middle of a military conflict between the US and Iran. No government is willing to test Iranian threats, even though some people think they are mostly bluff. The memory of Iraqi Scud missiles hitting Riyadh during the Gulf War in 1991 and Houthi missiles and drones hitting Saudi infrastructure in recent years is a powerful reminder of how much conflict costs in the region.
This calculation helps to explain why Gulf states haven't been very supportive of Iranian protesters. If people in Tehran support regime change, it could be seen as siding with American military pressure, which could put Gulf states in danger of Iranian retaliation.
The Diplomatic Track and the Desire for a Managed Transition
A more complicated diplomatic reality is coming to light behind the public silence. Recently, several Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have quietly tried to improve relations with Tehran by lowering tensions and setting up communication channels that could stay open even if the US or Iran changes leaders.
In 2023, China helped Saudi Arabia and Iran get along, which was a big change from years of bitter rivalry. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran remains weak and limited, but it has established a communication channel that both sides appear unwilling to abandon. Emirati officials have also kept in touch with their Iranian counterparts through back channels to protect their economic and security interests from the wider unrest in the region.
This diplomatic investment gives people more reasons to be careful. Gulf states that have used political capital to work with Tehran don't want to be seen as supporting its overthrow, even if they might privately want some changes in how Iran acts.
Most Gulf governments would like Iran to go through a managed transition, with new leaders who keep the country together and in charge of its military assets while softening the Islamic Republic's more aggressive policies. This change would ease Gulf worries about Iran's support for armed groups, nuclear ambitions, and ideological hostility without leaving a gap that would happen if the situation fell apart.
The Larger Regional Picture: Tiredness and the Limits of Ambition
The Arab silence regarding Iran must be comprehended within the overarching framework of regional fatigue. The ten years after the Arab Spring have been marked by almost constant fighting: civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen; the rise and fall of the Islamic State; economic problems in Lebanon, Egypt, and other places; and the terrible effects of the wars that started after October 7.
This long period of instability has changed the region's priorities in a big way. The grand plans of the early 2010s, whether they were the democratic hopes of Arab Spring protesters or the geopolitical goals of regional powers, have mostly been replaced by more realistic goals: keeping the peace at home, dealing with economic problems, and staying out of new conflicts.
In particular, the Gulf states have turned their attention to changing things at home. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, the UAE's efforts to diversify its economy, and Qatar's push for development after the World Cup are all long-term investments that need stability in the region to work. These governments don't want the problems that might come with the failure of the Iranian state, even though they have had problems with Tehran in the past.
In short, the mood in the region is one of war-weariness, not revolutionary excitement. Even governments that don't like the Islamic Republic and have been hurt by its policies want things to stay the same instead of changing.
The Arithmetic of Fear: Conclusion
Most Arab countries don't like the Islamic Republic, and most people wouldn't be sad if it went away. A lot of people would really like to see new Iranian leaders who would limit their nuclear program, stop supporting armed groups in the Arab world, and be less hostile toward their neighbors.
But the last twenty years have taught us hard lessons about the difference between wanting change and getting it and between wanting change and dealing with the effects. Governments that have to deal with refugee flows, fight against extremist infiltration, and keep the peace in the face of regional chaos have come to understand the high costs of state failure, costs that the theoretical benefits of regime change rarely outweigh in practice.
After years of war, displacement, and instability, the main fear in the Middle East is no longer Iran's power but the possibility that the region will become even more chaotic. The Islamic Republic, even though it is weak and humiliated, is still a coherent state that can be dealt with through diplomacy, and threats can be measured and handled. What might take its place is still very scary.
This calculus, the fear of the unknown outweighing resentment of the known, explains a lot of why Arabs are quiet right now. It's not apathy, approval, or even giving up. Instead, it is the planned calm of governments that have learned to fear chaos more than their enemies and know that the enemy of their enemy might be something worse.