Reports say that the Mexican government stopped some oil exports to Cuba earlier this week because the US put pressure on them. However, a Mexican humanitarian aid mission soon entered the country. The US embargo has played a big role in Cuba's long-lasting economic crisis. The US Treasury Secretary has even said that the US uses its economic power to force its enemies to do what it wants, as it did with Iran. This small episode is a good example of a much bigger trend: the relationship between US hegemonic enforcement and the growing willingness of regional actors to create their own spaces of independence.
Global Power and Regional Hegemony
The US became one of the two superpowers in the world after World War II. From 1991 to about 2017, it was the only superpower. During this time, it was the regional hegemonic power, meaning that no other state in the region could match its military might. No other global power had achieved such regional dominance.
This hegemony was not just about having more resources; it was also about being able and willing to change the political order in the rest of the Western Hemisphere. From this point of view, the US has repeatedly intervened in nearby countries, even using force, to make sure that everyone accepts its superiority. Harvard's ReVista says that from 1898 to 1994, the US government was able to change governments in Latin America at least 41 times. That's an average of once every 28 months for almost a century. Seventeen of these involved the direct use of US military forces or intelligence agents, while the other 24 were indirect interventions in which local actors would not have been able to succeed without American support.
The Bases of American Hegemony
The United States became the most powerful country in the world in the 19th century because it built up its industry quickly and became more aggressive in its foreign policy. It fought in four big wars and dozens of smaller ones, like the Indian Wars, between 1800 and 1900. It grew from about 890,000 square miles to more than 3.7 million square miles during the same time period, a 320% increase. This was done through land purchases, wars of conquest, and annexations. It also built a continental industrial market based on railroads and mass production.
By the early 1900s, the US was the world's biggest industrial producer and Britain's main naval and industrial competitor. President Theodore Roosevelt explained the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which said that the US had the right to act as a regional policeman and use military force to back up diplomatic pressure in order to protect American interests. This led to the "Banana Wars" era, when US troops were sent to the Dominican Republic (1903, 1904, 1916–1924), Nicaragua (1911, 1912–1933), Haiti (1915–1934), and other places. These deployments were often in line with the business interests of companies like the United Fruit Company.
In the last hundred years, we can name at least 15 major times when the US used force or secret operations to change or decide the political direction of another Latin American country. Some of the most well-known are:
Guatemala (1954): The CIA's Operation PBSuccess overthrew Jacobo Árbenz, the democratically elected president of Guatemala. His land reforms were bad for US business interests. After that, the country had to deal with military rule for more than 30 years and a civil war for 36 years.
Cuba (1961): The Bay of Pigs invasion failed to get rid of Fidel Castro. Then, in 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world close to nuclear war.
Brazil (1964): A US-backed military coup overthrew President João Goulart, starting 21 years of military rule.
Chile (1973): The CIA secretly helped the military coup that overthrew socialist President Salvador Allende and put General Augusto Pinochet in charge.
Nicaragua (1980s): The Reagan administration secretly sent Contra forces against the Sandinista government, which led to the Iran-Contra scandal.
Grenada (1983): Operation Urgent Fury was the first big US military operation since Vietnam.
Panama (1989): The invasion that brought down General Manuel Noriega. This was the last time the US military intervened in Latin America to change the government before the current period.
Today, the United States has a nominal GDP that is about 60% of the Western Hemisphere's total. It has a population that is about 1.6 times larger than Brazil's (the second most populous country in the region) and spends much more on its military than any other country in the region. The US defense budget is much bigger than the total military spending of all the countries in Latin America.
To gain power and then keep it in the Western Hemisphere, the United States used quick changes to the economy, military force, and political intervention as tools of foreign policy. History indicates that the prevailing trend under Trump—including the January 2026 strikes in Venezuela and the apprehension of Nicolás Maduro in Operation Absolute Resolve—is far from unprecedented in the broader context of US operations.
Changing the Strategic Agenda
But there was a long time when the US didn't get involved in Latin America as much, between the last big intervention to change the government in Latin America and the recent Venezuelan event.
The 1989 invasion of Panama, which overthrew Noriega, was the most recent time a government was overthrown with a lot of military force. The US also went into Haiti in 1994 to bring back President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. This time, the UN Security Council gave its permission, and the elected government of Haiti asked for it. This was different from Panama. Even though the U.S. still had political and economic power in the region after the Cold War, such as through sanctions against Venezuela during the first Trump and Biden administrations, this time was marked by a very low number of direct, large-scale military interventions aimed at regime change.
From the "Donroe Doctrine" to the Monroe Doctrine
The United States' main worry in the 1900s was that a foreign power could get a strategic foothold in Latin America. In the early 1900s, people were more worried about Europe in general. But during the Cold War, this worry became more specific with the Soviet Union, as seen in the Cuban missile crisis. The US's policy in the area was one of strategic denial, which kept non-American actors from getting involved.
The challenge has changed in two ways since then. First, it's possible that regional powers in the Western Hemisphere, like Brazil and Mexico, could get strong enough to stop or fight US intervention. Second, the new factor of Chinese economic penetration has made the Trump administration explicitly bring back the Monroe Doctrine.
The National Security Strategy for December 2025 says that "non-Hemispheric competitors" are a threat to the Americas. This is widely understood to mean that China is trying to gain power in the Americas. Trump came up with the term "Donroe Doctrine" after Maduro was captured. He said, "American dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never be questioned again." The NSS says that the US must have political, economic, commercial, and military control over the Western Hemisphere. It also lays out plans to change the US military presence in the region, build up naval forces, and use military power to protect access to energy and mineral resources.
Powers in the Western Hemisphere
Trump has openly fought with Venezuela and Cuba, but at the same time, his words and actions have hurt major economies in the region. For example, he threatened Mexico's manufacturing sector with tariffs, questioned Colombia's security situation (he accused President Gustavo Petro of being a drug dealer and cut off diplomatic aid), and accused Canada of unfair trade practices.
The Size of Regional Power
Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia are the three most populous countries in Latin America. Together, they have about 400 million people and about 5% of the world's GDP in terms of purchasing power parity. Claudia Sheinbaum and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva are the two most popular leaders in Latin America, and their approval ratings are still pretty high. Adding Canada brings the total population to about 425 million, and their combined economic weight is almost 6% of the world's GDP (PPP).
Mexico is one of the most industrialized major economies in the Global South. Its manufacturing sector makes up about 18–20% of the country's total production, which shows how important it is to North American production networks. Brazil is the biggest exporter in Latin America. In 2024, it will make 97.5% of Latin America's iron ore and 16.7% of the world's total.
Strategic Resources: The Mineral Aspect
Latin America is strategically important for more than just traditional farming and oil and gas. The area is very important to global supply chains for minerals that are needed for the energy transition and advanced technology:
Copper: Chile, Peru, and Mexico together make up about 40% of the world's copper production. In 2023, Chile alone sent about $34 billion worth of copper to other countries.
Lithium: In 2024, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil made up about 32–37% of the world's lithium production. The "Lithium Triangle" (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile) has about 50% of the world's lithium resources, which is much more than the US (16.5%), Australia (7.7%), and China (5.9%).
Silver: In 2024, Latin America produced more than 51% of the world's silver.
Other minerals: The area has a lot of bauxite (the main source of aluminum), zinc (23.5% of global output), nickel (about 25% of reserves), graphite, and rare earth elements.
The area also has a similar amount of global renewable freshwater flows and hydroelectric power generation, which makes it important not just for industrial minerals but also for the larger goal of sustainability. The IEA says that Latin America will get the biggest share of the growth in the value of the mining market around the world. By 2030, it will be worth about $120 billion, mostly because of copper.
The Period of Restraint and Its Causes
During the time of relative US restraint (roughly 1994–2025), the US was mostly interested in doing business in other places, mostly in the Middle East. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that came after the September 11 attacks used up a lot of money, soldiers, and diplomatic resources. There was no immediate systemic rival in the hemisphere, and the US kept its focus on places outside the Western Hemisphere because it was thought that strategic competition would come from Eurasia instead of Latin America. Latin America was already mostly doing business the way the West does.
But a big change was also starting to happen.
The Different Kinds of Relationships in Latin America
In the 21st century, Latin America's economy grew more slowly, but its trade and diplomatic ties with countries outside of the US and Europe became much more varied. The most obvious change has happened in China:
Trade: In 2024, trade between China and Latin America reached an all-time high of $518.5 billion, a 6% increase from the year before. This was more than the $500 billion goal China set for itself ten years ago. China is now the source of 22% of Latin America's imports and 13% of its exports.
Investment: In 2024, China put $14.7 billion directly into Latin America. China got almost seven times as much investment from 2010 to 2019 as it did in the previous decade. Latin American countries had opened 37,000 businesses in China by March 2025.
Infrastructure: Chinese contractors have worked on a lot more infrastructure projects in Latin America in the last few years. There are now more than 50% more projects than there were in the last five years. Transportation infrastructure has become the most important sector, taking the place of energy.
Strategic projects: The Chinese-funded deep-water megaport at Chancay, Peru, can handle very large container ships and is a big step up for China's logistics in the hemisphere. People are still talking about the Twin Ocean Railway plan that would connect Brazil and Peru.
Since 2000, trade with India has grown by about six to eight times, trade with South Korea by about three to four times, and trade between Latin America and Africa by about four to five times.
This diversification has made Latin American countries more independent, as shown by recent disagreements and policy differences with the US. Brazil's renewed political focus on the Global South and its active role in the BRICS under President Lula—hosting the Rio de Janeiro BRICS summit, getting ready for COP30 in Belém, and broadening Mercosur's scope to include South–South partnerships—are all signs of this growing independence. Colombia joined the Belt and Road Initiative in May 2025, when President Petro was in charge. Changes in the relationships between US partners in the Western Hemisphere, such as Canada's stronger move toward strategic autonomy after Mark Carney was elected, show that regional alignments are slowly changing, which Washington has openly criticized.
A New Age for the Americas
Today, Washington is slowly losing power to important regional players. The United States will continue to be the most powerful country in the Western Hemisphere for the time being, but this relative convergence may make it harder for the US to get involved in the internal affairs of other countries in the region.
The Logic of Reassertion
The Trump administration's return to direct interventionism—bombing a South American capital for the first time, sending the USS Gerald Ford carrier group off the coast of Venezuela, sinking ships that were thought to be carrying drugs, and explicitly citing the Monroe Doctrine—shows that the US can no longer rely on just economic pressure and diplomatic isolation to stay on top.
The NSS from December 2025 says that problems in Latin America, like mass migration and drug trafficking, are more dangerous to US security right now than wars in other parts of the world. It talks about plans to work more closely with friendly governments to break up drug cartels, link US aid to efforts to lower migration, and stop what it calls "hostile foreign control" of strategically important assets. This is a direct reference to China's growing presence.
The Basic Problem
As the likelihood of Latin American regional powers undertaking collective measures to curtail US interference increases, the United States seems to be returning to the historical strategies that established its hegemonic status. But this new assertiveness raises a big question: will these tools help the US stay on top, or will they make the region more diverse by encouraging Latin American countries to strengthen their own strategic and military capabilities and deepen their economic ties with other countries?
The early evidence is not clear. Mexico has raised import tariffs on Chinese goods, probably to please Washington. This is because Mexico is closely tied to the US through the USMCA. Under President Milei, Argentina has closely followed Trump's plans. But Brazil has responded by getting more involved with the BRICS and the Global South. China's exports to Latin America grew by almost 8% by November 2025, even though its exports to the US fell by 18%. This shows that Beijing sees the region as an important alternative market in its trade war with Washington.
Chinese policy experts have called the Trump Corollary a type of hegemonic exclusion, and Beijing's official analysis says it makes Latin American countries choose between sovereignty and development. Beijing's strategy for Latin America was based on the idea that the international legal system would protect economic engagement. The Venezuela operation has fundamentally challenged this idea.
The Western Hemisphere doesn't look anything like it did when Monroe or Roosevelt were in charge. Latin American nations have transitioned from post-colonial states to sovereign entities characterized by varied political orientations, global alliances, and, crucially, control over mineral resources vital to the 21st-century economy. The main strategic question for the next ten years is whether the United States can maintain its dominance in this new environment using the same historical playbook.